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The Myth of the Ideal Investor 
Elisabeth de Fontenay* 
ABSTRACT 
Critiques of specific investor behavior often assume an ideal investor 
against which all others should be compared. This ideal investor figures 
prominently in the heated debates over the impact of investor time 
horizons on firm value. In much of the commentary, the ideal is a long-
term investor that actively monitors management, but the specifics are 
typically left vague. That is no coincidence. The various characteristics 
that we might wish for in such an investor cannot peacefully coexist in 
practice. 
If the ideal investor remains illusory, which of the real-world investor 
types should we champion instead? The answer, I argue, is none. The 
corporate finance ecosystem evolves at such a rapid pace that interventions 
specifically designed to encourage particular types of investors are 
increasingly likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive: we are 
destined to place our bets on the wrong horse, time and again. 
To illustrate the difficulty, this Article briefly sketches the evolution 
of three types of shareholders frequently advanced as exemplars based on 
their time horizons: major mutual fund groups, activist hedge funds, and 
private equity funds. Based on their behavior to date, there is little support 
for policies aimed either at favoring or penalizing such investors’ 
participation in the capital markets generally, and corporate governance 
specifically. 
INTRODUCTION 
The corporate governance literature remains deeply divided over the 
impact of investor time horizons on management agency costs and firm 
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value. Long-term shareholders are often praised for their incentives to 
increase corporate value over the long term;1 their willingness to take into 
account the interests of non-shareholder corporate stakeholders (such as 
creditors and employees) who may be instrumental to firms’ long-term 
growth;2 and their patience—the ability not to be distracted by a firm’s 
short-term results, which may be due to chance rather than managerial 
performance.3 
By contrast, proponents of short-term investing argue that long-term 
investors do a comparatively poor job of maximizing firm value.4 Because 
long-term investors today are generally institutional, they may suffer from 
incentive problems that render them excessively passive vis-à-vis 
management.5 Alternatively, they may aggressively advance particular 
agendas that are inconsistent with investor wealth maximization.6 For such 
critics, the workhorses of the corporate governance world are activist 
hedge funds, which relentlessly pursue relatively short-term increases in 
firms’ stock prices by appealing directly to management to make changes. 
Not surprisingly, then, proposals abound for both regulatory and 
private-ordering fixes designed to favor or discourage investors with 
particular time horizons. From the long-termist camp, there are proposals 
to give long-term shareholders greater weight in voting7 or to allow long-
term shareholders privileged rights to make shareholder proposals or 
nominate directors.8 Meanwhile, the short-termist camp would limit firms’ 
ability to defend against activist hedge funds9 and would prohibit dual-
                                                     
 1. See Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 570–71 (2016) (summarizing the various arguments in favor of long-tenured 
shareholders). 
 2. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing that shareholders should not be given sole control of the 
corporation because non-shareholder stakeholders are also essential to firm value). 
3. See Sunil Wahal & John J. McConnell, Do Institutional Investors Exacerbate Managerial 
Myopia?, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 307, 308–09 (1990) (defining investor impatience as pressuring management 
to underinvest in projects with long-term payoffs). 
 4. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) (finding activist interventions tend to increase firm value overall).  
 5. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889 (2013). 
 6. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796–97 (1993).  
 7. See, e.g., David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting 
and the U.S. Public Company, 72 BUS. LAW. 295 (2017); Dallas & Barry, supra note 1, at 570. 
 8. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112(1) (2017) (permitting Delaware corporations to 
condition a shareholder’s right to include its board nominee(s) in the corporation’s own proxy on a 
certain minimum duration of share ownership). 
 9. For example, one could prohibit the use of poison pills to penalize the acquisition of large 
share blocks even without the intent to acquire control. 
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class and other voting structures that can concentrate voting power in 
management.10 Adding fuel to the fire, the debate over investor time 
horizons is often merely a cover for the perennial debate over whether 
shareholders or managers should have more control over the corporation: 
generally speaking, the short-termist camp maps nicely onto the set of 
shareholder-rights advocates, while the long-termist camp draws heavily 
from corporate managers, their advisors, and scholars in the managerialist 
camp. 
Yet there is simply no consensus as to whether we should favor long-
term investors over short-term investors, or vice versa.11 While long-term 
investors appear to be winning in the court of public opinion,12 the 
academic literature is simply divided.13 This confused state of affairs is 
owed in part to the surprising difficulty of identifying the precise 
connection between (1) investors’ time horizon, (2) the time horizon of 
firm projects, and (3) the time horizon over which firm value is 
maximized. From an efficiency standpoint, most would accept that the 
goal is to maximize long-term firm value,14 defined as the discounted sum 
of all expected future cash flows of the firm. Yet, there is deep 
disagreement as to what project duration is likely to achieve that result, 
and what type of investor will most successfully induce management to 
adopt such projects.15 Lay discussions frequently conflate the three distinct 
inquiries. Critiques of the ill-defined “short-termism” of the financial 
markets, for example, frequently imply without proof that short-term 
investors prompt firms to favor short-term projects, with the goal of 
                                                     
 10. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4, 1152–53 (criticizing proposals that diminish voting rights 
of short-term shareholders and tighten disclosure requirements of acquiring firms). 
 11. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE 
L.J. 1554, 1574 (2015). Others have argued that the debate should be reframed as the conflict between 
current and future investors, rather than between short-term and long-term investors. See Henry T.C. 
Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of 
Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1287 (1991); Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal 
Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 
(2005). 
 12. Leaders of some of the largest U.S. investment fund groups have raised alarms over perceived 
short-termism in the markets. See, e.g., Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman, Blackrock, Inc., to CEOs 
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-gb/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter 
[https://perma.cc/4BUV-9Z9R]; Letter from F. William McNabb, III, Chairman & CEO, Vanguard 
Grp., to the Independent Leaders of the Boards of Directors of the Vanguard Funds’ Largest Portfolio 
Holdings (Feb. 27, 2015), https://about.vanguard.com/vanguard-proxy-voting/CEO_Letter_03_02_ 
ext.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VZM-6K2P]. 
13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and 
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 754–55 n.139 (2016). 
 15. See infra Part I. 
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maximizing firm value only over the short-term.16 In fact, however, the 
connection between these three measures remains largely unresolved, both 
theoretically and empirically. 
In light of this uncertainty, we lack a solid basis for the various policy 
proposals targeting investors with particular time horizons—
notwithstanding the confidence and urgency with which they are typically 
advocated. Perhaps firms do best precisely when their investors display a 
wide range of time horizons. Because there is no ideal investor, the push-
and-pull of investors with competing interests could plausibly produce the 
best outcomes, pitting the patience of long-term investors against the 
urgency of short-term investors.17 Policies tied to specific investor time 
horizons pose a further problem, which is that they are necessarily bets on 
the actions of the real-world investors that tend to adopt that horizon. 
Privileging or penalizing specific investor time horizons necessarily 
means privileging or penalizing specific types of investors. Favoring long-
term shareholders over short-term shareholders, for example, would 
amount to favoring mutual funds and pension funds over hedge funds. 
This game is a risky one to play, given the speed with which the 
capital markets and capital-market participants now evolve. The current 
debate pays insufficient heed to the fact that the characteristics of any real-
world investor type change over time and, arguably, at an accelerating 
rate.18 This rapid change significantly lessens our ability to predict the 
social-welfare impact of encouraging or discouraging such investors. As a 
result, any corporate governance intervention—whether imposed by law 
or adopted through private ordering—that is designed to favor one type of 
investor over another is problematic and can in fact prove 
counterproductive.  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly sets the scene for the 
investor time-horizon debate, offering a simple framework for situating 
                                                     
16. See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE BUSINESS AND SOCIETY PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-
TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS 
MANAGEMENT 2 (Sept. 9, 2009), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/ 
pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X5P-U5RE] (describing various harms 
associated with investor short-termism). 
17. Relatedly, Michal Barzuza and Eric Talley posit a helpful symbiosis between the long-term 
bias of management and the short-term bias of some investors. See Michal Barzuza & Eric L. Talley, 
Short-Termism and Long-Termism (Va. Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 2, 2016; Univ. of Cal. 
Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2731814, 2016; Columbia Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 14-
503, 2016; Colum. Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 526, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731814.  
 18. See Jennifer G. Hill, Images of the Shareholder—Shareholder Power and Shareholder 
Powerlessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 53 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall 
S. Thomas eds., 2015) (arguing that legal doctrine and regulation lag behind the changing profile of 
shareholders over time due to the mobility of capital and innovation and globalization in the capital 
markets). 
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the most common claims and critiquing conventional accounts. Parts II 
through IV illustrate the difficulty of betting on investor time horizons by 
describing the evolution of three types of investors that have been 
variously championed (or reviled) based on their time horizons: mutual 
funds, activist hedge funds, and private equity funds. In each case, their 
investment practices and impact on firms and governance have changed 
repeatedly, often in unexpected ways, and popular and academic 
enthusiasm have waxed and waned accordingly. Part V concludes by 
highlighting the ironic role that each of these three investors has played in 
the ongoing decline in U.S. public companies. Because this decline is not 
only unintentional but ultimately harmful to their respective interests, we 
might well wonder at the wisdom of relying on any one of them to solve 
all of our corporate governance ills. 
I. THE SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM DEBATE 
To make headway in the debates over “short-termism” and related 
policy proposals, one must first disentangle three inquiries that are 
frequently conflated: (1) firm value time horizons; (2) firm project time 
horizons; and (3) investor time horizons. These are addressed in turn. 
A. Firm Value 
From the sole perspective of economic efficiency, there is broad 
(though certainly not unanimous) agreement that a firm’s management 
should seek to maximize what we might refer to as long-term firm value.19 
A firm’s long-term value is typically defined as the (discounted) sum of 
all cash flows expected to be generated by the firm for the benefit of 
investors over all future periods.20 While the formula for calculating long-
term firm value is simple, estimating it at any point in time is far less so, 
requiring difficult predictions as to both firm-specific and market-wide 
measures. Conveniently, however, if the capital markets are 
informationally efficient—by which we mean that securities prices 
immediately and perfectly reflect all available information—then a firm’s 
                                                     
 19. Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 14, at 754–55 n.139. While there is disagreement 
over whether the goal of maximizing long-term value should be incorporated into law or remain a 
norm, Delaware court opinions occasionally make explicit reference to it when discussing director 
fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Virtus Cap. L.P. v. Eastman Chem. Co., C.A. No. 9808-VCL, 2015 WL 
580553, at *16 n.5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2015). However, J.B. Heaton argues that Delaware law pays lip 
service to the maximization of long-term firm value, when in practice is calls for the maximization of 
firm longevity, which may well be in conflict. See J.B. Heaton, The “Long-Term” in Corporate Law, 
72 BUS. LAW. 353 (2017). 
20. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 82, 94 (11th ed. 
2013). 
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current market value (which we may refer to as short-term firm value) 
should be precisely equal to its expected long-term value.21 Indeed, the 
current price of a firm’s shares should be no more and no less than the 
market’s estimate of all future cash flows of the firm that will be available 
to be paid to shareholders—and likewise with the current price of the 
firm’s debt obligations, if any. Management need only look to the 
aggregate market value of the firm’s various outstanding securities to 
obtain the market’s collective estimate of the firm’s value. 
Already we may precisely situate and critique the two competing 
views in this debate. First, as we have seen, it is theoretically possible that 
long-term and short-term firm value are but one and the same.22 It is not 
only possible but also plausible in markets like those for U.S. large-cap 
stocks, which are highly competitive and information-rich and thus, more 
likely to be efficient. If that is the case, however, then concerns over 
investor “short-termism” are entirely misplaced: rather than decry 
management’s and investors’ focus on short-term value, we should 
encourage it because short-term value is the best estimate of long-term 
firm value. Stated differently, in an efficient market, anything that 
increases short-term value increases long-term value and vice versa; there 
is, therefore, no point in paying heed to anything other than the firm’s 
current securities prices. 
On the other hand, it is also plausible that short-term and long-term 
value do not perfectly overlap, but the case must be made in a precise way. 
In order to claim that the focus on short-term value is somehow 
problematic, one must necessarily identify one or more informational 
inefficiencies in the relevant financial market. The literature to date offers 
many potential candidates, including (1) investor cognitive biases;23 (2) 
investor liquidity constraints;24 (3) limits to arbitrage;25 (4) agency costs 
                                                     
21. See id. at 328 (noting that in an efficient market, “every security trades at its fundamental 
value”). A more precise definition of market efficiency requires only that securities prices offer 
unbiased estimates of fundamental value. In other words, securities prices may deviate from 
fundamental value in an efficient market, but any such deviations will be randomly distributed. 
 22. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor 
Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 122–28 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover 
Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 467, 481 (1988) (highlighting the “wholly 
false” distinction between present and future firm value). 
 23. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. ECON. 443 
(1997). 
 24. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 601, 619 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997). 
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and cognitive biases in corporate management;26 and (5) agency costs in 
investment managers.27 This literature is too lengthy to survey here.28 
Suffice it to say that while certain inefficiencies in the capital markets have 
been well documented, the extent (if any) to which they create a material 
and exploitable wedge between short-term and long-term value remains 
largely unknown. 
B. Firm Projects 
Discussions of investor time horizons are often paired with claims 
about the time horizon of firm projects. A common worry, for example, is 
that the “short-termism” of the capital markets results in firms shifting 
away from long-term projects and investments toward shorter-term 
projects. Under pressure from activists, for example, a firm might choose 
to jettison its research and development and use the savings to increase 
shareholder payout. Even assuming that U.S. firms are shifting toward 
shorter-term projects, however, we would need to know more before 
concluding that this shift is problematic. Recall that the ultimate goal is 
the maximization of firm value over the long term, not the length of firm 
projects or the life span of the firm itself. A long-term project is not 
preferable to a short-term project (or vice versa) in the abstract; what 
matters is how each is expected to contribute to firm value.29 
The relevant inquiry is as follows. We can safely assume that for 
every firm, there is some mix of feasible projects that would maximize its 
expected long-term value, and that this mix may involve projects of 
varying time horizons. The relevant questions, then, include (1) what the 
value-maximizing (or “efficient”) mix of short-term and long-term 
projects is for any firm; (2) whether firms tend to depart from this efficient 
mix; and (3) if so, why. Because the first and second questions are so 
difficult to answer directly, they are often approached indirectly, for 
example, by observing whether firms’ investment mix changes over time 
or in response to particular shocks.30 
                                                     
 26. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic 
Corporate Behavior, 104 Q. J. ECON. 655 (1989) (providing a model in which management engages 
in value-decreasing behavior). 
 27. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5. 
28. For an overview of the various explanations for why short-term and long-term value may 
diverge, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, U. PENN. L. REV. 653, 691–708 (2010). 
 29. As stated, this principle is correct from the perspective of the firm itself. From a social-
welfare standpoint, however, it is likely that certain long-term projects, such as research in basic 
science, yield larger positive externalities for society than do short-term projects. 
30. See, e.g., Wahal & McConnell, supra note 3, at 320–23 (studying the effects of changes in 
institutional ownership on firm R&D expenditures). 
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Once again, available studies yield mixed results. The seemingly 
tautological question of whether short-term investors cause firms to switch 
to short-term projects is unresolved.31 Yet even if short-term investors do 
so, is that necessarily harmful to long-term value? The answer is far from 
clear. Perhaps in an ideal world, long-term projects tend to contribute more 
to firm value than short-term projects, all else being equal. Yet in the real 
world of management agency costs, it may be that short-term projects 
generate more firm value because they enable investors to better monitor 
managers and measure their performance.32 If that is the case, then both 
short-term and long-term investors should prefer short-term projects.33 
The puzzle remains. 
C. Investor Time Horizons 
We now return to the inquiry with which we began, namely whether 
there is an optimal investor time horizon, and if so, whether we should 
adopt policies to promote it. The first point to be made is that the focus 
should be on the time horizon of institutional investors, rather than retail 
investors.34 The last half-century has seen a seismic shift in investment 
channels, with the bulk of retail investors investing through financial 
institutions or investment funds.35 As a result, investor holdings have not 
only become increasingly institutionalized but also increasingly 
concentrated.36 We may therefore assume that institutional investors 
primarily determine both securities prices and governance outcomes in 
corporate America. 
                                                     
 31. For evidence that activist hedge funds (which are considered short-term investors) cause 
firms to adopt shorter-term projects, see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the 
Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016); 
YVON ALLAIRE & FRANCOIS DAUPHIN, INST. FOR GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGS., 
HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM: PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND SOME NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (Apr. 1, 
2015), http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20150401_Allaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7B8M-3B6X]. For the contrary view, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 4.  
 32. See Richard T. Thakor, A Theory of Efficient Short-Termism 2–4 (Aug. 12, 2016) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2821162. 
 33. See Barzuza & Talley, supra note 17, at 9 (modeling securities markets where (1) managers 
are overconfident, leading them to inefficiently favor long-term projects, and (2) investors are present-
biased, leading them to inefficiently favor short-term projects).  
34. “Retail investors” are comprised of individuals and households, whereas “institutional 
investors” include organizations like banks, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and 
other investment funds that tend to make large investments. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, 
Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025–26 
(2009). 
 35. See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (2d ed. 1986). 
36. See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-
Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872754. 
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What, then, do we know about institutional investors’ time horizons 
and their effects on long-term firm value? First, the received wisdom about 
institutional investor time horizons is often inaccurate. Paradigmatic 
“short-term” investors, such as activist hedge funds, are not all that short-
term.37 By contrast, “long-term” investors, such as mutual funds, have 
mixed horizons, and by some measures they should be considered 
relatively short-term.38 As for how such investors’ time horizons affect 
firm value, here again, the easy answer is not necessarily the correct one. 
We are often told that short-term investors engage in tactics that boost 
short-term value at the expense of long-term value.39 Yet we lack evidence 
that this is indeed the case.40 In fact, it can be shown that both short-term 
and long-term investors have incentives to occasionally push firms to 
engage in value-decreasing behavior.41 Without more convincing 
evidence, there is no a priori reason to favor one investor over the other. 
To conclude this Part, the theoretical and empirical literatures are 
largely unresolved as to whether short-term or long-term investors are 
better for firm value. The remaining Parts argue that even if the evidence 
favored one time horizon or the other today, it would not follow that we 
should adopt policies promoting investors with that time horizon. There 
are no ideal investors, only real-world ones. Parts II through IV offer brief 
thoughts on three such real-world investor types that are closely associated 
with a particular time horizon: mutual funds (which are associated with 
long-term investment), activist hedge funds (short-term), and private 
equity funds (medium-term). In each case, we find that their behavior and 
their impact on firm value and governance have changed remarkably, even 
over short periods, making it risky to bet on any particular investor type 
                                                     
 37. See Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1731–32 (2008) (finding that the median holding period for activist hedge funds 
between 2001 and 2006 was approximately twenty months). 
 38. See Anne M. Tucker, The Long & The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund 
Investment Time Horizons, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
39. See Martin Lipton et al., Taking Short-Termism Seriously: A Response to Charles Nathan, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/13/taking-short-termism-seriously-a-response-to-charles-
nathan/ [https://perma.cc/D3HS-G72R] (claiming that “short-termism and activism are significant 
contributors to diminished GDP and to economic decline”). 
 40. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism--In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 
BUS. LAW. 977, 1005–06 (2013) (noting the dearth of evidence of short-termism in the financial 
markets). Furthermore, theoretical models in which short-term investors affect the behavior of 
managers do not necessarily imply discrepancies between short-term value and long-term value. See, 
e.g., Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481 
(2009) (claiming that short-term “transient” investing by institutional blockholders can increase firm 
value); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 148 (1990). 
 41. See Fried, supra note 11.  
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by altering the rules of corporate governance. The dynamics of the capital 
markets are such that we do not know (even in the relatively short-term) 
what the outcome would be.42 
II. LONG-TERM INVESTMENT: MUTUAL FUNDS 
Direct retail investors, due to their short-term liquidity needs, their 
lack of sophistication, and their small, dispersed holdings, have long 
shouldered the blame for two evils in the capital markets: inefficient asset 
pricing and poor corporate governance. But direct retail investors are 
dwindling: institutional investors currently own close to 70% of the U.S. 
stock market,43 up from a mere 6.1% in 1950.44 Thus, the rise of 
institutional ownership—particularly by mutual funds—was welcomed in 
the early 1990s as a promising solution to the agency costs of corporate 
management,45 especially after draconian regulatory barriers to 
shareholder communications were removed from the federal securities 
laws in 1992.46 With retail investors pooling together into funds, corporate 
governance would be left in the hands of a much smaller number of fund 
managers, who would presumably have greater incentives and ability to 
be more active monitors and to maximize long-term firm value. This 
would be so even where individual retail investors entered and exited a 
fund in the very short term because the fund itself would maintain the vast 
majority of its assets invested in a broad array of firms and would do so 
for the foreseeable future. Combining relative sophistication and a long-
term investment horizon, mutual fund managers ought to have been the 
counterweight to corporate management that shareholders needed. 
Indeed, mutual fund complexes are often not only the longest tenured 
but also the largest shareholders of U.S. public companies.47 With such 
                                                     
 42. Cf. Jennifer G. Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. (2000) 
(tracing the many visions of the shareholder, which owe in part to changes in shareholder behavior 
over time). 
 43. Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: 
Trends and Relationships (Wharton Sch. U. Pa., Working Paper, Aug. 21, 2012), 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~keim/research/ChangingInstitutionPreferences_21Aug2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U4YG-6QZ6]. 
 44. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 874. 
 45. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 520 (1990); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and 
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); Mark J. Roe, 
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991). 
46. See Mark Roe, Free Speech for Shareholders?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1991 (critiquing the 
pre-1992 regime under which communications among shareholders were severely restricted). 
 47. See Posner et al., supra note 36, at 5–6.  
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significant holdings, mutual fund complexes have the capacity to exercise 
immediate and dramatic interventions in the corporate governance of firms 
in their portfolios, such as by (1) removing directors, (2) vetoing mergers 
and other management proposals, (3) initiating their own shareholder 
proposals, (4) meeting with management, or (5) waging public relations 
campaigns.48 Mutual funds’ massive ownership stakes would thus seem to 
solve the problem of rational shareholder apathy first identified by Berle 
and Means and avoid shareholder collective action problems to boot.49 
Yet the 1990s’ burst of optimism surrounding mutual fund 
participation in corporate governance proved short-lived. The anticipated 
revolution in corporate governance led by mutual funds never fully 
materialized. Instead, mutual fund managers quickly came to be viewed as 
excessively passive, continually rubber-stamping corporate management 
and reluctant to advocate for major change.50 Investment managers have 
incentives of their own, after all, and moving from direct shareholdings by 
retail investors to indirect holdings through investment funds added new 
and different agency costs to the corporate governance calculus.51 Indeed, 
the new received wisdom became that mutual funds would rationally 
invest little time and expense into monitoring firms for at least three 
reasons. 
First, mutual fund managers are compensated based on a fixed 
percentage of the assets in their funds, rather than on a share of profits, 
which substantially dampens their incentives to pursue value-increasing, 
but costly, interventions in governance.52 Managers of index funds, whose 
inflows have begun vastly outpacing actively managed funds in recent 
years,53 have even fewer incentives to intervene because they are judged 
solely on their ability to track the relevant market index. Seeking to 
“move” the index by expending costly resources on governance (which 
are borne solely by the managers and may not be passed on to the funds) 
                                                     
48. But see infra note 56 for restrictions on mutual funds’ active involvement in management. 
 49. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 71–82, 129–31 (rev. ed. 1967). 
 50. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887 (finding that only 4.5% of all shareholder proposals 
between 2007 and 2009 were proposed by mutual funds). 
 51. Id. at 865. 
 52. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 45, at 473–77. 
 53. See, e.g., Michael C. Macchiarola & Daniel Prezioso, Expanding Alternatives: From 
Structured Notes to Structured Funds, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 405, 444 (2017) (“[I]n calendar year 2015 
alone, passive index mutual funds and ETFs brought in $365 billion of new money while actively 
managed funds suffered net outflows.”); Patrick Keon, Vanguard Group’s Passively Managed Mutual 
Funds Dominate Net Inflows for 2016, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2017), 
http://lipperalpha.financial.thomsonreuters.com/2017/01/vanguard-groups-passively-managed-
mutual-funds-dominate-net-inflows-for-2016/ [https://perma.cc/DB78-JN5W]. 
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is thus unlikely to be an optimal strategy for them.54 Where index funds 
are concerned, moreover, the threat of exit is obviously not credible when 
negotiating with corporate management. Second, mutual fund managers 
are commonly affiliated with financial institutions that cater to large 
corporate clients, or seek to attract their retirement funds, presenting a 
conflict of interest with regard to their willingness to critique firm 
management.55 Finally, large mutual fund managers that “seek to 
influence” management are subject to very heavy disclosure burdens, 
which places an upper bound on their involvement.56  
Just as shareholder advocates had begun to give up on mutual funds, 
however, the landscape shifted yet again. Since 2004, mutual fund 
managers have been required to disclose how they vote their shares in 
publicly traded corporations.57 Under public pressure to do so, mutual fund 
groups have, by two measures, significantly increased their involvement 
in corporate governance.58 First, they have ceased voting consistently in 
line with corporate management, instead often following the 
recommendations of proxy advisory firms hired specifically for this 
purpose.59 Second, they have occasionally supported campaigns by hedge 
fund activists.60 Given the major mutual fund groups’ shareholdings, an 
activist campaign’s success is all but assured once it attracts the mutual 
fund groups’ votes.61 This, in turn, dramatically increases the incentives 
                                                     
 54. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1050–51 (2007). 
 55. See id. at 1054–56; Jennifer Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers 
to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 101 (2009); see also James D. Cox & John W. 
Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 908 
(2005) (noting that fund managers are often faced with conflicts regarding “gaining admission as one 
of the acceptable vendors of 401K plans for a portfolio company’s employees and confronting a 
shareholder-friendly proposal (e.g., separating the position of CEO and board chair) that is opposed 
by that portfolio company’s management”). 
 56. Investment advisers that own or control 10% or more of a firm’s shares and that seek to 
influence the control of the corporation are required to file Schedule 13D with the SEC, which calls 
for extensive disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).  
57. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2017). 
 58. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887. 
 59. For detailed reviews of the relationship between mutual funds and proxy advisory firms, see 
Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY 
L.J. 869 (2010); James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual 
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010); Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & 
Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1359 (2014).  
 60. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 5, at 887–88 (explaining that mutual funds tend to support 
activist campaigns that oppose management on anti-takeover measures like declassified boards and 
poison pills). 
 61. Id. at 886, 896. 
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for activists to wage campaigns in the first place and to spend more 
resources on them.62 
Given their vast ownership stakes and their privileged position as 
long-term shareholders, should we seek to increase mutual funds’ 
influence in corporate governance, whether through regulation or private 
ordering? Should long-term shareholders be given additional weight in 
shareholder voting, for example? Should we ease the remaining regulatory 
impediments to mutual funds’ active involvement in governance? What 
we know of mutual funds today does not provide a sound basis for such 
policies.  
First, despite the renewed vigor of mutual funds’ interventions in 
governance, for the time being, their involvement remains muted and 
idiosyncratic, and their record in governance is mixed.63 As discussed, 
their occasional interventions in governance often depend on the prior 
efforts of shareholder activists. Yet any policy that favors long-term 
investors over short-term investors will reduce the latter’s ability to wage 
activist campaigns in the first place, thus potentially (and ironically) 
leading to less intervention by mutual funds.  
Further, mutual fund complexes routinely engage proxy advisory 
firms for recommendations as to how they should vote their shares.64 The 
delegation to proxy advisory firms is controversial, however. On the one 
hand, such firms specialize in governance issues and can devote significant 
time and resources to them. On the other, given that their clients cover the 
entire span of public companies, proxy advisory firms generally take a 
position on a specific governance issue across the board, rather than 
tailoring their recommendations to individual companies. For those who 
believe that corporate governance is far from a one-size-fits-all 
proposition,65 this approach may be value-decreasing. Increasing the 
voting power of mutual funds would also worry those convinced by recent 
studies suggesting that cross-ownership by mutual funds leaves open the 
possibility for collusion and decreased competition among firms in their 
portfolios.66 
                                                     
 62. See, e.g., Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a 
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 610, 610 (2013) (finding that proxy fights by activist 
hedge funds cost approximately $10 million on average). 
 63. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered 
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016). 
64. See James D. Cox et al., Quieting the Shareholders’ Voice: Empirical Evidence of Pervasive 
Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1175, 1201 (2016) (noting the influence of proxy 
advisory firms in the shareholder voting process). 
 65. Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate 
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1818 (2008). 
 66. See Posner et al., supra note 36. 
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Finally, although mutual funds have a long history in the United 
States, they continue to evolve in ways that do not make for easy 
predictions with respect to corporate governance. In just the last two 
decades, mutual funds have experienced major shifts, such as the surge in 
indexing (at the expense of active investing);67 the rise of alternative 
mutual funds (which make heavy use of derivative instruments and can 
even be short-biased);68 and the increase in investments in large private 
companies, such as Uber.69 Each of these developments potentially upends 
our understanding of mutual fund strategies and incentives. 
More broadly, we do not truly know whether investors today are 
intervening too much or too little in governance.70 Even if the answer were 
“too little,” would greater involvement by mutual funds, in particular, be 
value-increasing? 
III. SHORT-TERM INVESTMENT: ACTIVIST HEDGE FUNDS 
Complaints about “short-termism” in the financial markets are often 
directed at activist hedge funds, the proverbial thorn in corporate 
management’s side. While activist shareholders have always existed in a 
loose sense, private investment funds specifically organized to affect 
decisions in public companies are a new phenomenon—little more than 
two decades old. Activist hedge funds acquire non-controlling stakes in 
firms’ stock, and then seek to drive up the stock price by advocating for 
major changes in corporate operations (e.g., layoffs), strategy (e.g., 
acquisitions or spin-offs), capital structure (e.g., issuing more debt in order 
to buy back stock), and corporate governance (e.g., replacing board 
members or executives). The critique, at base, is that by increasing short-
term value, the very actions that generate high returns for hedge funds have 
negative consequences for long-term value.71 In other words, hedge funds 
                                                     
 67. See Robin Wigglesworth, ETFs Are Eating the US Stock Market, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/6dabad28-e19c-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a. 
 68. See Wulf A. Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds, in ELGAR HANDBOOK ON 
MUTUAL FUNDS 3 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083 (describing 
the rise of alternative mutual funds). 
 69. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Main Street Portfolios Are Investing in Unicorns, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/main-street-portfolios-are-
investing-in-unicorns.html (describing the recent phenomenon of mutual funds investing in private 
tech companies). 
 70. For competing views on whether managers, shareholders, or other corporate stakeholders 
should control the corporations, see generally STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 71. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed 
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
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can sometimes fool the market in the short run, but they leave companies 
with fewer productive assets for the long run. 
Yet activist hedge funds have fierce defenders, particularly in the 
scholarly literature, where they are frequently viewed as the lone bright 
spot in an otherwise dismal corporate governance landscape for U.S. 
public companies.72 Proponents point to large-scale studies finding, on 
average, positive abnormal returns to shareholders associated with the 
announcement of an activist campaign,73 with some evidence of 
persistence after the campaign has concluded.74 In other words, other 
shareholders appear to welcome activist hedge funds’ interventions, which 
in turn suggests that they do yield benefits for shareholders. Should we 
therefore mold the law or develop private ordering solutions to promote 
hedge fund activism? 
The answer is less than clear. These studies’ conclusions are not 
universally accepted.75 Separately, studies linking activist campaign 
announcements to a boost in share price suggest only that shareholders 
gain in expectation from activist campaigns—at least temporarily—but 
these studies do not speak conclusively to the effect on firm value as a 
whole. Recall that firm value is the aggregate of future cash flows 
available to all investors—shareholders and creditors alike. Yet the gains 
to shareholders from activist campaigns may be achieved, at least in part, 
at the expense of firms’ creditors.76 For example, an activist campaign that 
causes management to increase payout to shareholders may 
simultaneously lower the value of the firm’s debt securities: with less cash 
                                                     
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790–91 (2015) (arguing that “directors are 
increasingly vulnerable to pressure from activist investors . . . and that this pressure may logically lead 
to strategies that sacrifice long-term performance for short-term shareholder wealth”). 
 72. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 4 (providing evidence that successful hedge fund activist 
campaigns lead to increases in firm value); Alon Brav et al., The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: 
Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 2723, 2763–64 (2015) 
(providing evidence that activist hedge funds improve firm productivity). 
 73. See Brav et al., supra note 37, at 1730–31; April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial 
Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN. 187, 188 (2009). 
 74. See Bebchuk, et al., supra note 4. 
 75. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value 
(Dec. 14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2693231 (claiming that many of the positive shareholder returns associated with activist campaigns 
are merely the result of selection bias because activist funds target underperforming companies, and 
that activist campaigns actually result in lower returns as compared to matched peer companies). 
 76. See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s 
Existing Bondholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1735, 1737 (2011) (finding that bondholder returns decline 
upon the announcement of an activist campaign targeting the firm); Jayanthi Sunder, Shyam V. Sunder 
& Wan Wongsunwai, Debtholder Responses to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from Hedge Fund 
Interventions, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3318, 3320–21 (2014) (finding that several types of activist 
campaigns result in widening loan spreads for the target firm). 
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on hand, the firm is more likely to experience financial distress and fail to 
make its debt payments.77 This is critical for two reasons. 
First, to the extent that activist hedge funds have succeeded thus far 
in extracting value from creditors, creditors should be expected to push 
back.78 Creditors of large corporations today have already responded to 
the rise of hedge fund activism by adopting provisions, such as dead-hand 
proxy puts, to penalize firms where activist investors gain board seats over 
the objection of creditors.79 While the Delaware courts have proven 
skeptical of such devices for the time being,80 both the odds that activist 
campaigns will succeed and the gains when they do are likely to decline 
as creditors develop new ways to discourage activism. 
Second, if creditors are in fact harmed by activist campaigns, then 
the proposition that hedge fund activists increase long-term firm value is 
subject to challenge, even if we accept the evidence that they tend to 
produce gains for shareholders on average. Once again, a firm’s value is 
the value of the firm’s equity plus the value of its debt.81 Actions that 
increase share value by decreasing debt value therefore have an ambiguous 
effect on overall firm value. A one-time transfer of value from creditors to 
shareholders may give a large boost to share price but in turn raise the 
firm’s cost of capital if it makes it much more difficult for the firm to raise 
debt capital in the future.82 On the other hand, the most widely cited study, 
which examines activist campaigns between 2001 and 2006, finds that 
such campaigns are associated with positive shareholder returns even in 
firms with no outstanding debt,83 which would in fact suggest that the 
                                                     
 77. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 31, at 603. 
 78. The current state of affairs is similar to the first wave of leveraged buyouts by private equity 
funds, in which shareholders seized considerable value from firms’ existing creditors by increasing 
the firm’s credit risk through asset substitution, increased leverage, and increased payout. See 
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 80. Cf. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 307 
(Del. Ch. 2009), aff’d, 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009). 
81. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
 82. Of course, the current share price on the market should take into account the firm’s expected 
future cost of capital, but the one-shot, immediate transfer of wealth from current creditors to 
shareholders may be large enough to offset the longer term negative impact on cost of capital from 
shareholders’ perspective. 
 83. See Brav et al., supra note 37, at 1767 (finding increased shareholder returns even for firms 
with no long-term debt). 
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benefits of activism do not derive solely from wealth transfers between 
creditors and shareholders. Yet the answer to this question may well 
change as shareholders’ and creditors’ strategic game unfolds. 
Finally, deep skeptics of market efficiency are unlikely to be 
convinced by the positive shareholder returns associated with activist 
campaigns, likely viewing the study designs as circular. Indeed, it is 
unsurprising that activist campaigns overall result in stock price 
increases—they would not wage them otherwise. For market efficiency 
critics, the real question is whether such short-term stock price increases 
actually reflect increases in long-term firm value—something that 
examining short-term stock price movements cannot answer for them. 
More generally, there is substantial uncertainty over what returns 
hedge fund activism will yield in the future and what effect it will have on 
firm behavior. Even over their short history, activist funds and the markets 
in which they operate have changed significantly. The low-hanging fruit 
are gone: companies with obviously underperforming management and 
ready fixes to operations or strategy have been picked clean in prior waves 
of activism.84 Competition among activist funds has already lowered their 
expected returns, and the pervasive threat of activism has succeeded in 
changing the behavior of corporate management ex ante,85 even at firms 
that have not yet been targeted. While potentially a positive result for 
corporate governance, this preemptive effect reduces the opportunities for 
activist hedge funds to earn abnormal returns, leaving their future 
somewhat in doubt. Competition could also lead activist hedge funds to 
engage in riskier strategies or one-time value extractions from creditors 
that are far less likely to lead to increases in firm value. Finally, many 
firms remain immune to activist campaigns, whether because of their size 
or their ownership structure, placing a cap on activism’s impact on 
governance.86 For all these reasons, it appears premature to place bets on 
                                                     
 84. See generally C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The 
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 85. See Jesse M. Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows 1 (Harvard Bus. 
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a class of investor that has been a material presence in the market for no 
more than two decades.87 
IV. MEDIUM-TERM INVESTMENT: PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
Ever since Michael Jensen predicted the “eclipse of the public 
corporation,” private equity funds have been hailed by many as the ideal 
investor to control management agency costs and increase firm value.88 In 
contrast to dispersed shareholders of public companies, private equity 
funds hold controlling stakes in mature businesses,89 giving them clear 
incentives to exert effort to maximize corporate value.90 Although private 
equity funds delegate the day-to-day conduct of corporate business to 
professional management,91 just as public-company shareholders do, they 
engage actively and aggressively in governance. Private equity-owned 
corporations have smaller boards that meet more frequently than public-
company boards;92 managers viewed as underperforming are quickly 
replaced; and management is incentivized with the “carrot” of high-
powered incentives and the “stick” of a highly-levered capital structure, 
which forces the firm to operate leanly and focus closely on cash flows.93 
We may think of private equity funds as medium-term investors. 
Ironically, private equity funds are both praised and criticized for their 
time horizon. On the one hand, private equity funds typically have a term 
of ten years, which is likely to be substantially longer than the holding 
                                                     
 87. Frank Partnoy, U.S. Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER 
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(2009) (discussing how managers of private-equity-owned firms are compensated). 
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period for investments by hedge funds and most retail investors.94 Thus, 
private equity funds have, in theory, both the time and the incentives to 
make major operational changes in their portfolio companies that increase 
long-term value. On the other hand, a private equity fund tends to hold 
portfolio companies for significantly less than the fund’s term (5.5 years, 
on average95), because it takes time for the fund to identify and acquire 
target companies, and then ensure that they are sold well before the end of 
the fund’s term. 
More importantly, the manner in which private equity fund managers 
are compensated creates incentives for them to hold portfolio companies 
for as short a time as they can achieve an exit at a large gain. In the typical 
structure, the manager does not receive any share of the profit from fund 
distributions until the fund has surpassed an 8% “preferred return,” which 
is an internal rate of return (IRR) on the capital invested by the fund’s 
limited partners.96 All else being equal, the longer that the fund retains 
investors’ capital, the lower the fund’s IRR will be, and thus the lower the 
manager’s compensation. IRR figures are also the primary means used to 
measure and market private equity firms’ performance, as advertised in 
their private placement memoranda. Thus, at least for portfolio companies 
that will be sold at a large gain, there is a strong incentive for the private 
equity fund to sell as quickly as possible—the “quick flip” often 
complained about in the press. 
If the timeline is short enough, private equity firms can benefit as 
much or more from short-term swings in the capital markets (such as an 
unusually favorable window for IPOs) than from implementing long-term 
strategic plans. Indeed, evidence suggests that at least some of the returns 
generated by private equity funds are derived from mere market timing 
rather than operational or governance changes.97 
Just how well do private equity funds do at maximizing firm value? 
By now the answer should come as no surprise: it is largely unclear. There 
is some evidence that private equity has generated small net gains in 
employment (albeit at the cost of more layoffs), innovation, and 
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productivity, at least over certain periods.98 While the thrust of the finance 
literature appears to take a positive view of private equity, there are 
considerable obstacles to measuring its effect empirically, most notably 
selection effects (i.e., the fact that private equity firms do not pick their 
portfolio companies randomly).99 
Just as we saw with activist hedge funds, however, increasing 
competition among private equity funds has altered their behavior.100 
Whether rightly or wrongly, fund sponsors have recently been accused of 
shifting their attention away from the difficult task of increasing firm value 
toward the much easier approach of extracting value from their own funds 
and portfolio companies.101 When given the choice between (1) taking a 
dividend of its portfolio company’s available cash—even at the cost of 
putting it at high risk of financial distress—and (2) making risky, costly, 
and difficult operational changes that may not pay off for years, the former 
may occasionally be irresistibly tempting. This is particularly true given 
that private equity funds can simply choose to put their portfolio 
companies to creditors in bankruptcy, although established fund 
managers’ reputational concerns should help constrain such behavior.102 
Given fund sponsors’ considerable financial sophistication and their 
option-like compensation, it should come as no surprise that their tactics 
change constantly in the hunt for returns. Recently, private equity funds 
have begun borrowing to fund the equity portion of their portfolio 
companies’ purchase price, making their investment even more akin to an 
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option and further altering their incentives.103 Separately, the largest 
private equity firms now simultaneously manage funds with radically 
different investment strategies, in different asset classes, and sometimes 
with directly conflicting interests.104 Consider, for example, a sponsor 
whose equity fund and credit fund are both invested in the same distressed 
portfolio company. The difficulty of pinning down private equity to a 
particular time horizon and investment strategy suggests considerable 
uncertainty for policies designed to subsidize or restrict its activities. 
CONCLUSION 
Policy proposals to favor either long-term or short-term investors 
appear to have outpaced the theoretical and empirical literatures, which 
remain deeply divided as to which, if any, are more likely to help 
maximize firm value. Similarly, there is little basis for favoring the major 
investors that currently embody long-term, short-term, or medium-term 
investing, such as mutual funds, activist hedge funds, and private equity 
funds, respectively. Substantial uncertainty persists about the current role 
of each in corporate governance, and perhaps more importantly, we have 
every reason to believe that the nature, magnitude, and desirability of their 
involvement will change significantly over time. 
This state of affairs is perhaps best illustrated by pointing out a 
glaring irony regarding mutual funds, activist hedge funds, and private 
equity funds: arguably, their greatest impact on corporate governance is 
not only unintentional but in many respects antithetical to their own 
business interests. Specifically, each of these three investors has 
contributed to the ongoing decline in the number of U.S. public 
companies.105 While the causes of this decline are numerous and complex, 
there is reason to believe that each of these fund types shares some of the 
blame by materially reducing the incentives of U.S. firms to go and remain 
public. 
How so? First, mutual funds have shifted their investments over the 
last two decades toward the largest public companies due to their increased 
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demand for the most liquid securities.106 In turn, this shift likely 
contributed to the demise of the small company IPO.107 With smaller firms 
increasingly shunning the public markets, the set of U.S. public companies 
is simply shrinking. 
Second, certain firms may be avoiding the public markets in part to 
avoid hedge fund activists.108 While activists’ impact on firm value is 
subject to debate, founders and managers’ distaste for activists is not. 
While some firms go public today with dual-class voting structures that 
help shield them from activists,109 others are simply choosing to go or 
remain private, foregoing entirely the benefits of public company status, 
such as liquidity. 
Finally, private equity funds also contribute to the decline in public 
companies. One explanation for this decline is simply that it has become 
so much easier for firms to remain private in recent decades.110 This is 
partly due to the explosion of capital now available to private firms.111 
Private equity funds, among others, figure prominently in this story. They 
have been so successful at raising funds that they have helped lower the 
cost of equity capital dramatically for private firms, thereby inducing even 
some very large firms to remain private. 
The painful irony for these three investor groups is that the decline 
in public companies, should it persist, is problematic for each of them. 
Fewer companies going public eventually means fewer investment 
opportunities for mutual funds, which are constrained in their ability to 
invest in private firms due to their statutorily-imposed liquidity 
requirements. Activist hedge funds currently only target public 
companies; their returns depend on being able to enter (buy) and exit (sell) 
a target’s stock relatively quickly, a tactic that would not be feasible in 
illiquid private company stock. Finally, IPOs have historically been 
                                                     
 106. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, What Happened in 1998? 
The Demise of the Small IPO and the Investing Preferences of Mutual Funds (Ohio St. Pub. Law, 
Working Paper No. 328, 2017; Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2718862, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2718862. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See Matt Levine, Uber Is Raising More Money from Rich People, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-01-15/uber-is-raising-more-money-from-rich-people 
(noting that private companies today have most of the advantages of public companies, without any of 
the disadvantages, including hedge fund activists). 
 109. See Kristin Lin, The Big Number—Share of IPOs This Year with Dual-Class Stock 
Structures, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-big-number-1439865699 
(reporting that the proportion of IPOs with dual-class structures increased from 1% in 2005 to 
approximately 14% in 2015). 
 110. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the 
Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 448, 466–72 (2017) (tracing the easing of regulatory burdens 
on the issuance and trading of private securities). 
 111. See id. at 467. 
2018] The Myth of the Ideal Investor 447 
private equity funds’ most profitable means of exiting their portfolio-
company investments. As IPOs decline, it remains unclear whether private 
equity funds can make up the returns elsewhere. 
It should give us pause that what will perhaps prove to be these three 
investors’ longest lasting and most profound effect on corporate 
governance has not been the result of their direct interventions, but rather 
the indirect, unintended consequences of their behavior. Calls to give 
investors more weight in U.S. corporate governance based on their time 
horizons should, therefore, be answered with some skepticism. We have 
little means of predicting how such investors would respond when put in 
the driver’s seat. After all, by contributing to the decline of public 
companies, mutual funds, activist hedge funds, and private equity funds 
may be quietly undermining their own business models. Who would have 
predicted that? 
 
